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We study the impact of child care for toddlers on the labor supply of mothers and fathers in Norway. For identi- 
ﬁcation, we exploit the staggered expansion across municipalities following a large child care reform from 2002. 
Our IV-estimates indicate that child care causes an increase in the labor supply of cohabiting mothers who move 
towards full time employment. Despite this, average taxes paid on the extra income is low, lending little support 
to the argument that parts of the cost of child care is oﬀset by increased taxes. Meanwhile, we ﬁnd no impact for 
fathers. 
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(. Introduction 
Over the last decade, policymakers have shown increasing interest
n government interventions in the market for child care. The OECD has
iscussed the introduction of early childhood programs in several re-
orts ( Field et al., 2007; OECD, 2006 ); in Germany, South Korea, Canada
nd the Scandinavian countries, governments have been pushing to ex-
and access to subsidized care. In the US, President Obama proposed
o make “high-quality preschool available to every child in America ” in
is State of the Union address 2013 . 
An important argument in favor of governments subsidizing and fa-
ilitating child care availability is the claim that child care helps recon-
ile work and family responsibilities, thereby increasing mothers’ labor
orce participation ( OECD, 2006 ). A positive impact on labor supply may
lso mean that the public cost of providing child care is partly mitigated
y increases in the tax base or reduced beneﬁt dependence. 
In this paper, we estimate the labor supply and tax impacts of child
are using a large increase in child care availability for toddlers (age 2)
n Norway following a reform from 2002 to expand child care to cover
emand. The reform increased government subsidies to investment in☆ We thank Nina Drange, Kjetil Telle, Oddbjørn Raaum, Kalle Moene, Monique de H
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 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) nd running of child care institutions, and generated large variation in
he supply of child care between municipalities and over time. Our esti-
ation strategy exploits the diﬀerence in child care expansion between
unicipalities following this reform to get credible estimates on how
hild care aﬀects the labor supply of mothers and fathers, as well as
ther potential caregivers. Because child care for toddlers was strongly
ationed in this period, changes in the availability should be driven pri-
arily by the changes in supply as a result of the reform, and not by
hanges in local demand. To guard against omitted variable bias, we
onetheless document that our estimates are robust to controlling for
 large set of observable characteristics and to a range of speciﬁcation
hecks. 
An important improvement over much of the literature is that we ob-
erve a continuous measure of the individual use of child care through-
ut the year. This allows us to implement an IV strategy, using the avail-
bility of child care as an instrument for the actual enrollment, which
ccounts for the intensity of child care use. Our estimates reﬂect, there-
ore, how a full year of child care enrollment aﬀects mothers’ labor sup-
ly, rather than the direct eﬀect of additional child care slots that open at
ome point during the year, which is estimated in most of the literature.aan, Joshua Angrist, Beata Javorcik, Ragnhild Balsvik, Ragnar Torvik, Kai Liu, 
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t  here are at least two reasons why accounting for the intensity is impor-
ant. First, new child care places are typically created in August, at the
tart of the school year. This mechanically gives a maximum child care
se of around 42% for most children, i.e. 5 out of 12 months. Second, to
he limited extent that child care places are not utilized to capacity, child
are institutions have quite extensive discretion to scale provision to ac-
ual use, by e.g. adjusting employee hours. In this case, treating child
are places as uniform independent of utilization will overestimate the
ost of provision. A further improvement over much of the previous lit-
rature is that we identify both cohabiting and single mothers, as well
s fathers and grandparents. 
This is among the ﬁrst papers to provide evidence on how large-scale,
niversal child care for toddlers aﬀects parental labor supply. 1 In con-
rast, the sizable literature on child care and mothers labor supply has
een focused mostly on child care for preschoolers (age 3–6), for whom
heree are important reasons to believe that the impact on parental la-
or supply may diﬀer. Descriptively, young children who are not in child
are are much more likely to be cared for by one of the parents in the
ome (often the mother), while older children are more often cared for
y informal childminders, like relatives, friends, or nannies. This may
e due both to a stronger reluctance among parents of young children to
se informal child care arrangements, or to less supply of informal care
or young children. Either way, we would expect that the availability of
hild care for young children may have a stronger potential to increase
abor supply of parents than availability of care for older children. 
Our results indicate that child care for toddlers has substantial ef-
ects on mothers’ labor supply. A married or cohabiting mother induced
o use a full year of child care by the reform is 32 percentage points more
ikely to be employed, compared to mothers who do not use child care
t all. 2 This is over a baseline of 63% participation before the reform,
nd associated with an earnings increase of 66,000 NOK (8,000 USD) for
ohabiting mothers. We also investigate persistence in the labor supply
esponse, ﬁnding positive impacts 1–3 years later. For single mothers,
e ﬁnd contradicting and imprecise results that preclude strong conclu-
ions. 
Proponents of subsidized child care commonly claim that parts of the
ost of such subsidies are oﬀset by the increased tax revenues or reduced
eneﬁts generated by the additional income of working mothers. Using
ata on actual tax payments, we can go beyond back-of-the-envelope
alculations found in previous literature to show that the increased taxes
aused by child care use is, at least in our case, insigniﬁcant and rela-
ively small. Speciﬁcally, our estimates suggest an average tax rate of
bout 14% on the extra income, much lower than the average tax rate.
t the same time, the increased access to child care and higher employ-
ent does not seem to lead to signiﬁcant reductions in beneﬁts, which
ould further have reduced public spending. 3 
For fathers, we ﬁnd no labor supply response. This may indicate
hat mothers are still the primary caretakers, staying home when child
are is not available. Meanwhile, estimates on working age grandpar-
nts show that there is no response among maternal grandparents, but
odest eﬀects on the labor supply of paternal grandparents. Interest-1 See, however, Givord and Marbot (2015) ; Goux and Maurin (2010) for two 
tudies on child care for 2-year olds and the studies on the Quebec reform ( Baker 
t al., 2008; 2015; Haeck et al., 2015; Kottelenberg and Lehrer, 2013; 2017; 
efebvre et al., 2009 ) discussed below, which investigates child care for various 
ges from 0 to 5 years old. 
2 Throughout, we refer to married and cohabiting mothers interchangeably 
 our main sample consists of both married mothers and unmarried mothers 
iving together with the child and the father of the child, as cohabitation without 
arriage is common in Norway. 
3 Note that this does not include the mechanical eﬀect on the substantial cash- 
or-care beneﬁt tied to child care use in subsidized child care, nor does it include 
he parental copayment. Combined, these imply a parental cost of full time child 
are use of about NOK 90,000 per year, more than canceling out the positive 
ﬀects on after-tax income. 
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ingly, while paternal grandmothers work more, paternal grandfathers
ork less when the child is using child care. This may suggest that pa-
ernal grandmothers are important informal caregivers to some 2-year
lds, while there is an indirect income eﬀect on grandfathers. 
We contribute to the rapidly growing literature estimating how child
are availability aﬀects parental labor supply. Most of the previous lit-
rature studies pre-school children at ages 3–6, and ﬁnd modest ef-
ects. 4 For younger children, evidence is more limited, but some recent
tudies indicate that eﬀects might be larger for this group than older
hildren, in line with our ﬁndings. Goux and Maurin (2010) , for in-
tance, study a cutoﬀ to school start for 2- and 3-year olds in France,
stimating that about one single mother enters employment for ev-
ry four 2-year olds enrolled. In comparison, they do not ﬁnd eﬀects
n single mothers of 3-year olds or cohabiting mothers. Givord and
arbot (2015) study an increase in child care subsidies and esti-
ate that the reform caused small but signiﬁcant increases in the la-
or supply of mothers of 2-year olds, but not 3-year olds. Carta and
izzica (2018) study a reform that expanded access to highly subsi-
ized child care to 2-year olds in Italy in the mid-2000s, reporting ef-
ects of 5–7 percentage points on the labor participation of mothers.
auernschuster and Schlotter (2015) study the introduction of a legal
ight to care in Germany for 3-year olds and ﬁnd impacts of similar
agnitude to what we ﬁnd in the current paper, while the estimates for
 Spanish child care reform expanding access for 3-year olds are around
alf as large ( Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas, 2015 ). Estimates for
he Netherlands in Bettendorf et al. (2015) are modest. Finally, esti-
ates for 1–3 year old children are zero or negligible in studies from
outh Korea, Germany and Sweden ( Busse and Gathmann, 2018; Lee,
016; Lundin et al., 2008 ). 
An important issue in comparing estimates across studies, is that
he intensity of treatment, and hence the implicit scaling of estimates,
iﬀers widely. Goux and Maurin (2010) , for instance, estimate a fuzzy
D-design using French census data, where school enrollment is instru-
ented with an age cutoﬀ and the outcome is stated labor force partic-
pation. This generates estimates per child enrolled in school on a ﬂow
easure of labor supply. In contrast, Carta and Rizzica (2018) follow
uch of the literature on preschool aged children to consider reduced
orm eﬀects on yearly measures of labor supply directly. To interpret
hese estimates, they consider changes in child care access that do not
apture the intensity of use. Since new child care places according to
he authors were opened in September, the utilization rates in the ﬁrst
ear should be expected to be much lower than in following years. In
his case, the estimates reported will understate the eﬀects of the child
are expansion on labor supply over a full year. 
Our IV-strategy resolves the issue of partial treatment and scales
he eﬀect to the increased use of child care caused by the expansion.
his should, on the one hand, ensure that our estimates are closer to
he expected impact of the child care expansion over time, when child
are places are available throughout the year. It should, on the other
and, facilitate the application of our estimates in other contexts, where
he take-up rates may be expected to diﬀer from what we observe in
ur data. Our IV-estimates can arguably be compared more directly
o those in Goux and Maurin (2010) , given that actual use in France
as substantial after enrollment. In contrast, estimates in Carta and
izzica (2018) should be scaled by the intensity of the reform to give4 In the US, for instance economically small eﬀects are found by 
elbach (2002) , Cascio (2009) , Fitzpatrick (2010) ; Fitzpatrick (2012) ) and 
arua (2014) . Similar eﬀects are found in several European countries see e.g. 
inseraas et al. (2017) ; Goux and Maurin (2010) ; Havnes and Mogstad (2011) ; 
undin et al. (2008) , while several papers on a child care reform in Que- 
ec suggest more sizable eﬀects, see Baker et al. (2008) , Lefebvre and Merri- 
an (2008) , Lefebvre et al. (2009) and Haeck et al. (2015) . For reviews of this 
iterature, we refer readers to Blau and Currie (2006) and more recent overviews 
n Akgunduz and Plantenga (2018) and Morrissey (2016) . 
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6 All monetary values are given in thousands of 2017-NOK unless otherwise 
noted. 
7 Nominal values, comparable numbers in 2017 NOK are 3600 NOK for the 
2004 cap and 2800 NOK for the 2006 cap. NOK/USD ≈8.4. 
8 Over the period the CFC beneﬁt varied from 2200 to 2800 NOK per month TT-estimates before being compared to our reduced form estimates.
hese latter estimates are in fact quite comparable in size. 
Mixed support for a tight link between parental labor supply and
hild care availability or prices is disappointing from a policy perspec-
ive, since increasing mothers’ labor force participation is a key policy
oal in many countries. Our estimates suggest that the modest eﬀects
ould be explained by two things: First, the take-up of child care in the
nitial periods following child care expansion may not be complete. In-
eed, in our case, the start of the child care year in August implies that
he children who occupy the newly expanded slots will usually attend at
ost ﬁve months of care in the ﬁrst year. Our study allows to reﬁne pre-
ious estimates by exploiting data on the intensive margin of child care
se rather than relying on crudely aggregated data. Second, as empha-
ized by e.g. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) , substitution into formal care
rom informal sources rather than home care would suggest that eﬀects
f child care are smaller than might be initially expected. In this case,
ather than releasing mothers to the labor market, child care is taken up
y mothers who are already working and relying on some form of infor-
al care arrangement. Our results then suggests that informal sources of
are may be less important as an alternative to formal care for younger
ompared to older children. Both alternatives imply that the potential
or child care policies to stimulate mothers’ labor supply may be larger
han suggested in much of the recent literature on preschool children. 
The paper proceeds as follows: We ﬁrst cover the institutional set-
ing and the child care reform in Section 2 , while Section 3 presents the
egistry data used for estimation, the samples of interest and some de-
criptive statistics. Section 4 presents our IV method with ﬁxed eﬀects.
esults are found in Section 5 , including persistence analysis. We per-
orm a range of robustness checks to support our estimates in Section 6 ,
hile Section 7 concludes. Additional results, primarily for fathers and
ther caregivers, are found in an online appendix. 
. Institutional setting and the child care reform 
Although the roots of the Norwegian child care system date back to
he early 19th century, 5 the system of universal child care was intro-
uced after WWII as a response to increasing female labor force par-
icipation and the goal of gender equality in the Nordic welfare model
 Ministry of Education and Research, 1998 ). Increasing excess demand
or formal care in the 60’s and 70’s led to the Kindergarten Act of 1975,
nd a strong increase in the supply of formal child care for preschool
hildren ( Havnes and Mogstad, 2011 ), eventually leading to a high cov-
rage rate for preschool children by 1990. 
Fig. 1 (a) shows the trends in child care access for preschoolers and
oddlers from 1998–2012. Throughout, we use as our measure of child
are access the reported child care coverage rate, i.e. the share of chil-
ren of a particular age that are enrolled in any child care on December
5th of each year. By 2000, close to 80% of 3–5 year olds were enrolled
n formal child care. At the same time, child care access was much lower
or younger children. In 2000, less than 50% of 2-year olds and 30% of
-year olds in Norway were enrolled in child care, and there was sub-
tantial excess demand for child care, see the discussion in Section 3
elow. 
This excess demand for formal child care was the background for the
indergarten concord, a reform that was formally passed in the Norwe-
ian Parliament in 2003 with broad bipartisan support, but whose main
ines were agreed upon and made public the year before. A key goal of
he reform was to facilitate parental labor force participation, under the
remise that universal child care is central to promoting gender equality
n the labor market ( Ministry of Education and Research, 2002–2003 )
he reform aimed to oﬀer aﬀordable child care to all children, and to
ecure quality and diversity in child care services ( Ministry of Education5 See Ministry of Education and Research (2008–2009 ) for a thorough treat- 
ent. 
i
u
w
mnd Research, 2002–2003 ). The concord aimed to achieve these goals
hrough increased subsidies, lower parental fees and investment subsi-
ies for the construction of new child care slots. Also, while state sub-
idies were allocated based on a ﬁxed piece rate per child in care, with
hildren below 3-years old earning double rates, municipalities before
he reform had local autonomy over their allocation of subsidies. In prac-
ice, municipal subsidies covered on average 34% of costs in municipal
hild care institutions but only 9% of costs in private institutions, even
hough costs were substantially lower in private institutions (St.prp. 1
2003–2004)). The concord aimed to make it easier for private suppliers
f care to enter the market by mandating equal economic treatment of
rivate and public child care institutions. 
Fig. 1 presents some important changes in the child care sector fol-
owing the reform. Fig. 1 (b) depicts the total investment in child care
nstitutions over the period. 6 Note that most investments appear with a
ag of 1–2 years, as they were applied for and disbursed after the slot
as opened. The ﬁgure shows clearly how total investments increased
apidly following the reform. Fig. 1 (c) shows the increase in state sub-
idy rates per child per year. Fig. 1 (d) shows the changes in the compo-
ition of the costs covered by the municipality, the central government
nd parental fees. It is clear that the share of costs covered by parents
as declined signiﬁcantly. This ﬁgure also shows that municipal support
as not reduced as a response to the increased government subsidies.
he large overall increase in expenditures over the period is a result of
oth more children in care, higher subsidy rates, and an increasing share
f toddlers, requiring more staﬀ and resources per child. 
A central part of the reform was the implementation of a maxi-
um price on child care. This was implemented from 2004 and put
 cap of 2,750 NOK on the monthly fee that could be charged from
arents for a full time slot. In 2006, the cap was lowered further to
250 NOK per month. 7 In addition, all families with children below
hree years old who were not enrolled in subsidized child care were eligi-
le for a substantial cash beneﬁt under the cash-for-care (CFC) scheme.
his implies that the price to parents was eﬀectively about twice the
evel suggested by the cap. 8 Throughout the period we consider, formal
hildcare was highly regulated. To be eligible for the generous subsi-
ies, both private and public child care institutions were subject to strict
uality criteria, e.g. to the ratio of pedagogical staﬀ to children, open-
ng hours, parental involvement and available playing space per child
 Kindergarten Act, 2005 ). The maximum price and the strict regulation
f quality, ensures that formal child care institutions are relatively ho-
ogenous in terms of observable attributes of quality and price. 
The responsibility for meeting child care demand fell on municipali-
ies, who could expand care by direct investment or with the help of
rivate suppliers. The expansion, however, seems to be hard to pre-
ict for local governments, who often struggled to meet demand over
he years following the reform. The most common reasons for under-
upply reported by the municipalities themselves were a) demographic
hocks, particularly unexpected changes in the number of children, b)
ocal geographic mismatch of supply and demand, c) unexpected in-
reases in demand and d) unexpected delays in construction projects
 Asplan Viak, 2007 ). Many municipalities also seem to be overly opti-
istic in regards to covering all child care demand, and write in their
nnual reports in several successive years that they expect to reach full
hild care coverage the following year ( Asplan Viak, 2004–2010 ). n 2017 NOK per child, equivalent to approximately 270–350 USD per month 
sing the December 2017 exchange rate. Note that these changes were nation- 
ide and should not aﬀect our estimation which is based on variation across 
unicipalities. 
M. Eckhoﬀ Andresen and T. Havnes Labour Economics 61 (2019) 101762 
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10 We thus consider a full year of half time care (about 20 h per week) to be 
equivalent to one half year of full time care. We have experimented with other 
measures, without this substantially changing the results. In practice, part time 
care is relatively rare, as shown in Fig. 6 below. 
11 http://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken , table 04683. In a few cases a munici- 
pality will have a coverage rate slightly above 1 because children from neigh- 
boring municipalities attend care. These have been adjusted to 1. 
12 In a contemporary report for the Ministry of Education, ECON Anal- 
yse (2004) concluded that hidden demand from parents who do not apply when As illustrated in Fig. 1 (a), the reform resulted in a sharp increase
n municipal child care access for 1 and 2-year olds. Over a nine year
eriod, child care coverage rates for toddlers increased by around 40
ercentage points for both age groups. In our empirical analysis, we
im to evaluate the impact of this massive increase in child care access
n the labor supply of mothers and fathers using the variation in timing
f the expansion between municipalities. 
. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data is based on rich administrative registers available from
tatistics Norway, and cover the entire resident population. The data
ontain individual information on demographics (e.g. sex, age, immi-
rant status, marital status, number of children), socioeconomic status
e.g. years of education, income, taxes paid, employment status), and
unicipality of residence. Income and employment data are collected
rom tax records and other administrative registers. The household in-
ormation is from the Central Population Register, which is updated an-
ually by the local population registries and veriﬁed by the Norwegian
ax Authority. We also have access to national registry data on munic-
pal child care enrollment reported by the child care institutions them-
elves and aggregated at the municipality level. Importantly, the data
ontain unique personal identiﬁers that allow us to match children to
arents, grandparents and other caregivers residing with the child. Data
n child care use comes from the cash for care-registers as detailed be-
ow. We ﬁnally utilize various municipality characteristics from Statis-
ics Norway, including data on rural and urban population, employment
y sector and gender, political representation and municipal income and
pending. 
To deﬁne the population of interest , we start with all two-year
lds residing in Norway in 2002–2008. Following most of the literature,
e focus attention on the youngest child in the household, and exclude
ultiple births and children with younger siblings born to the same
other or father. 9 We also exclude children with unknown mothers and
 handful of households with more than one child in the sample (born to
iﬀerent parents but living in the same household). This leaves us with
 sample of 325,396 children. 
We next identify all working-age household members of these chil-
ren (ie. aged 18 to 67). We consider cohabiting mothers and fathers to
e parents that live in the same household as the child. Notice that our
eﬁnition of cohabiting parents includes both married and non-married
ouples. If both parents are not present in the child’s household, we
dentify suitable stepfathers or stepmothers from age, family relations
nd gender of the present parent. This allows us to identify the likely
aregivers relevant for the vast majority of the children in the sample.
rom population registers, we can also identify mothers and fathers that
o not reside with the children, as well as grandmothers and grand-
athers. Our main samples of interest will be cohabiting mothers and
athers, as well as single mothers and non-residing fathers. We have
lso considered other potential caregivers, like step-parents, but these
amples are small and do not give enough power to allow meaningful
nalysis. 
To measure individual child care use , we exploit the administrative
egisters of cash-for-care (CFC) recipients, available since 1999. As dis-
ussed above, under the CFC-scheme, all families with children below
hree years old who were not enrolled in subsidized child care were eligible
or a substantial cash beneﬁt. From the CFC-registers, we know which
hildren receive the CFC-beneﬁt each month and the exact amount dis-
ursed. As long as eligible parents take up the beneﬁt, we can infer the
hild care use of each child. Because children who attend subsidized
are part time are eligible for part time cash for care, we can also mea-9 Fertility could be considered endogenous to the child care expansion. In 
ection 6 , we include also children with younger siblings to verify that this 
ample restriction is not driving our results. 
t
w
4
lure the intensity of child care use each month. This approach has the
dvantage of giving a comprehensive measure of child care use over the
ear, to allow correctly scaling the impact of child care expansions that
re not immediately taken up. Our ﬁnal measure gives for each child
he fraction of full-time equivalent months of child care use during the
ear. 10 Note that child care use by this deﬁnition will relate only to the
se of subsidized child care. This is consistent with our deﬁnition of
hild care coverage rates and in line with the deﬁnitions used in most
f the previous literature where unsubsidized child care is included in
he category of “informal care ”. 
To measure number of available child care slots in each munici-
ality, we use the number of children in child care by age from munic-
pal reports, measured on December 15th each year, when enrollment
n the regular calendar year is completed. Our measure of child care
ccess converts these numbers to coverage rates by taking the number
f slots as a fraction of the population of the same age as measured
n January 1st in the following year, around two weeks after the head
ount child care measure. These data are readily available from Statis-
ics Norway. 11 Similar measures are used regularly in the literature, see
.g. ( Dustmann et al., 2013; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011; Nollenberger
nd Rodríguez-Planas, 2015 ). 
One potential issue with these measures is that in clearing markets,
hild care access will be determined jointly by supply and demand. Ex-
loiting variation in child care access may then pick up demand shocks,
hich would raise the potential for reverse causality and estimation
ias. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that there was large under-
upply of child care to toddlers in Norway in the period we consider.
f so, the variation in child care access we exploit should be driven by
ariation in the supply of child care, rather than by increased utilization
f existing child care places. In order to verify the anecdotal evidence,
e would ideally like to have data on the number of applications in
ach municipality. Unfortunately, this data is not available. As an alter-
ative, we secured access to survey data on waiting lists collected on
ehalf of the Ministry of Education. The survey collected information
rom municipalities on the number of children 0–2 years old who were
n waiting lists for child care in each municipality by September 20th
ver 2004–2009 Asplan Viak (2004–2010 ). By adding children enrolled
nd children on waiting lists, we can construct a measure of the child
are application rate. 12 
Fig. 2 plots the child care coverage rate and our measure of the
hild care application rate for 0–2 year olds over our estimation pe-
iod. Throughout the period we can measure, the application rate is
ubstantially higher than the coverage rate, by between 10 and 15 per-
entage points, indicating excess demand. Note that these data were
ollected for the combined group of 0–2 year olds only, so do not speak
irectly to the instrument we will use below (child care coverage for
-year olds). However, this is likely to cause us to underestimate the
evel of rationing, since the vast majority of children will neither ap-
ly nor enroll in child care in the ﬁrst year of life, when their parents
re on parental leave. 13 The online appendix provides ﬁgures of thehey want care for their children, was negligible. 
13 In 2002, Norwegian parents were entitled to 42 (52) weeks of parental leave 
ith 100% (80%) wage compensation, expanded to 43 (53) weeks in 2005 and 
4 (54) weeks in 2006. Parents are further entitled to one year each of unpaid 
eave in immediate continuation of regular parental leave. 
M. Eckhoﬀ Andresen and T. Havnes Labour Economics 61 (2019) 101762 
Fig. 1. Child care access, investments and ﬁnancing in the 2000’s. Note: Child care coverage rates are deﬁned as the number of children in care to the overall 
population of children in that age group. Investmentsrefers to total gross investment in the child care sector from municipal and institutional reports. Yearly state 
subsidies per child are the national subsidies paid to municipalities per child in care. Composition of ﬁnancing are from municipal and institutional reports. Sources : 
Statistics Norway and regjeringen.no. 
Fig. 2. Child care application and coverage rates for 0–2 year olds. Note: Ap- 
plication rates are constructed by adding the number of children in care to the 
reported number of children on waiting lists for care and dividing by the number 
of children in the municipality. Note that the numbers are not directly compa- 
rable to Fig. 1 (a), because they include 0 and 1-year olds. Sources: Reports from 
Asplan Viak (2004–2010 ) and Statistics Norway. 
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aistribution of rationing across municipalities and years for which we
an measure, indicating that more tnan 55% of the municipality-years
e can measure, covering around 90% of the children in our sample,
ere subject to at least some degree of rationing, a fair share of them
o more severe rationing. In our robustness analysis below, we use thisata to investigate the potential for reverse causality by restricting focus
o more severely rationed municipalities. 
To measure labor supply we exploit two alternative data sources.
irst, we use yearly earnings from wages and self-employment collected
rom tax records. This measure includes parental leave and sickness ab-
ence beneﬁts. As outcome variables, we use both earnings directly, as
ell as dummy variables for labor market participation based on the
asic amounts in the Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme (used to de-
ne labor market status, determine eligibility for unemployment ben-
ﬁts as well as disability and old age pension). Speciﬁcally, we follow
avnes and Mogstad (2011) and construct dummy variables for employ-
ent and full-time equivalent status that equal one if earnings exceed
 and 4 basic amounts, respectively, and zero otherwise. In 2017, one
asic amount was around 94,000 NOK, or approximately 11,300 USD.
he tax records additionally provide data on total tax payments, trans-
ers and beneﬁts that we use as additional outcomes to evaluate the
mpact on public spending and income. 
Second, we use data from the matched employer–employee regis-
er, with information about all public employees and for about 80% of
rivate employees. These data give information on start and end dates
f employment spells, and bracketed information on contracted hours
n each spell. From these data, we construct yearly measures of labor
upply as the number of weeks during the year when contracted hours
re above four hours and above 30 h. A caveat in using these outcomes
s that we set labor supply to zero when information is missing in the
ata. This will tend to drive down the level of labor supply compared to
he true level. This should not, however, aﬀect our estimates unless the
attern of missing observation is changing over time and these changes
re correlated with changes in child care coverage rates. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for all children at age 2, 2002–2008. 
Children 
Variable All years All years SD 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Female 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Older maternal siblings 1.00 1.06 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.97 
Child care use 0.47 0.42 0.32 0.39 0.51 0.67 
Child care access 0.66 0.16 0.51 0.59 0.73 0.83 
Observations 325,396 48,603 45,363 45,939 47,279 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for caregivers at child age 2. 
Cohabiting Cohabiting Single Non-residing 
mothers fathers mothers fathers 
A. Outcome variables 
Earnings 260.2 518.7 119.7 322.0 
Tax 66.11 155.4 27.93 93.57 
Transfers, excl. cash for care 56.74 18.49 198.1 50.51 
Employed 0.678 0.914 0.309 0.699 
Full-time eq. 0.398 0.841 0.150 0.539 
Weeks of 4 h 37.17 43.58 21.35 32.17 
employment above 30 h 26.44 41.69 13.15 29.02 
B. Control variables 
Age 32.65 35.55 29.52 32.46 
Immigrant 0.097 0.074 0.087 0.080 
Years of education 14.53 14.19 12.60 12.33 
Number of children 2.029 2.056 1.719 1.818 
below 6 years old 1.517 1.516 1.282 1.331 
below 13 years old 1.893 1.878 1.553 1.596 
below 18 years old 1.995 1.987 1.666 1.718 
Observations 285,860 285,670 33,564 29,545 
Note: Outcome and control variables are deﬁned in Section 3 . Monetary values in 1,000s 
of 2017 NOK. 
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b  .1. Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics for the sample of children and the four main sam-
les of caregivers are given in Table 1 and 2 . We see that the sample of
hildren is well balanced with respect to gender, and that children have
ne older sibling on average. The average child care use is 0.47, cor-
esponding to 5.6 months of full time care. Table 2 gives descriptive
tatistics for four groups of caregivers: cohabiting mothers, cohabiting
athers, single mothers and non-residing fathers. We notice immediately
n panel A the substantial diﬀerences in terms of labor supply. Single
others are least attached to the labor market, with only 31% employed
nd 15% in full time-equivalent employment. In comparison, cohabiting
athers are strongly attached to the labor market, with 91% employed
nd 84% full time. Also cohabiting mothers are much more attached
o the labor market than single mothers, with about 68% employed,
nd 40% in full time. These diﬀerences are mirrored in their earnings,
here cohabiting fathers on average make almost twice that of cohab-
ting mothers, and more than four times that of single mothers. We also
ote that labor supply measured in terms of the number of weeks with
ontracted hours above 4 and 30 hours reﬂect well the overall picture
rom the earnings-based measures. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents means of control variables for the four
roups of caregivers. We note that cohabiting mothers and fathers have
bout 14 years of completed education. The table also shows single
others and non-residing fathers have substantially less education and
re around three years younger than cohabiting parents. Meanwhile, fa-
hers are about three years older than mothers, and somewhat less likely
o be of immigrant background. 
To get a ﬁrst look at the trends in labor force participation among
hese groups, Fig. 3 investigates labor force participation over the period
or the four groups of caregivers separately. For comparison, we also
nclude the trend for working age women with no school aged children.
e note that just over 60% of these women are employed, of whichbout two thirds is full time. For both measures, however, the overall
rend is relatively ﬂat over the period. 
If the large increase in child care availability has an eﬀect on parents’
abor supply, we would expect that this was evident in the ﬁgure by an
ncrease in labor supply relative to the observed pattern for the rest
f the labor force. For cohabiting fathers in our sample, the trend is
ery similar to the overall trend, with little change over time, though
ith employment above 90%, the level is clearly higher. In contrast,
ohabiting mothers experienced substantial increases in the labor force
articipation over these years. In particular, employment rates increased
y about 10 percentage points, driven largely by full time-equivalent
mployment among cohabiting mothers. For single mothers, there is also
 slight upward trend, but the picture is less clear. 
Finally, Table 3 presents means of control variables for cohabiting
others biennially over our estimation period 2002–2008. We note that
ost variables exhibit a relatively ﬂat trend over time, which suggests
hat the composition of mothers is stable over time. The exceptions are
he growth in immigrant background from about 8%–12% and a small
ncrease in education. Similar patterns are seen for the other groups of
aregivers, which are reported in the online appendix. 
. Empirical strategy 
The most straightforward way to estimate the eﬀect of child care
n labor supply is to regress a measure of labor supply on child care
se. This ignores, however, that child care use is endogenous to parents’
abor supply decisions. Clearly, parents that enroll their children in child
are are likely to be more closely tied to the labor market. This simple
pproach is therefore likely to yield estimates of how child care use
ﬀects labor supply that are biased upwards. 
Imagine instead a social experiment that randomized child care ac-
ess at the municipal level. This randomization breaks the correlation
etween child care access and unobserved determinants of parental
M. Eckhoﬀ Andresen and T. Havnes Labour Economics 61 (2019) 101762 
Fig. 3. Labor force participation for caregivers of 2-year olds and working age women without children below 18, 2001–2009. Note: Employment and full time- 
equivalent is deﬁned as earnings above 2 and 4 basic amounts (BA), respectively, see Section 3 . 1 BA ≈NOK 94, 000 ≈USD 11, 300. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for cohabiting mothers, 2002–2008. 
2002 2004 2006 2008 
A. Outcome variables 
Earnings 221.3 240.7 271.2 313.7 
(181.9) (230.0) (211.0) (220.1) 
Tax 57.8 64.3 67.8 76.1 
(63.8) (70.5) (74.7) (138.2) 
Transfers, 66.8 58.8 52.9 47.7 
excl. cash for care (57.9) (64.0) (60.2) (58.9) 
Employed 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.75 
(0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.43) 
Full-time eq. employment 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.47 
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) 
Weeks of 4 h 35.0 36.3 37.8 40.0 
employment above (22.4) (22.2) (21.3) (19.9) 
30 h 23.5 25.4 27.3 29.9 
(24.6) (24.8) (24.7) (24.4) 
B. Control variables 
Age 32.3 32.6 32.8 32.9 
(4.81) (4.83) (4.83) (4.92) 
Immigrant 0.084 0.090 0.10 0.12 
(0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.32) 
Years of education 14.1 14.4 14.7 14.9 
(2.93) (2.93) (2.95) (2.97) 
Number of children 2.05 2.03 2.03 2.00 
(0.99) (1.00) (0.98) (0.98) 
below 6 years old 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 
(0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
below 13 years old 1.91 1.89 1.89 1.87 
(0.84) (0.83) (0.83) (0.82) 
below 18 years old 2.01 2.00 1.99 1.97 
(0.94) (0.94) (0.92) (0.92) 
Observations 42,587 39,648 40,444 41,817 
Note: The table gives biennual means and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
in the estimation sample. Variables are deﬁned in Section 3 . Monetary values 
in 1,000s of 2017 NOK. 
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14 This could in principle be taken into account directly by scaling the estimates 
to the potential take-up, i.e. dividing the reduced form-estimates by 5/12. 
15 Of course, we could scale the costs to reﬂect the intensity rather than the 
estimates, but this would in any case require a ﬁrst stage estimate for the inten- 
sity of use and would introduce statistical uncertainty also in the cost measures, 
complicating the analysis. abor supply. Comparing labor supply of parents in municipalities with
nd without child care access would give a reduced form estimate of the
ﬀect of child care access on parental labor supply. Comparing child care
se in municipalities with and without child care access would give a
rst stage estimate of the eﬀect of child care access on child care use.
aking the ratio between the two, we would get an IV-estimate of the
ﬀect of child care use on parental labor supply. 
The intention of our IV-approach is to mimic this hypothetical exper-
ment. We exploit the staggered expansion in child care following the
002 child care concord, which generated large spatial and temporal
ariation in child care access. The distribution across municipalities ofhild care availability for 2-year olds is illustrated in Fig. 4 , where we
raw municipal child care coverage rates over 2002–2008. The ﬁgure
hows both the strong increase in child care access over the period we
onsider, and the large variation across municipalities. 
We start by considering the reduced form eﬀect of this expansion,
elating changes in child care access to changes in labor supply. This
uggests the following model: 
 𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝜅𝑘 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝐶 𝑘𝑡 + 𝐗 𝑖𝑘𝑡 𝜸 + 𝜁𝑖𝑘𝑡 (1)
here y ikt is a measure of labor supply for caregiver i in municipality k
n year t, 𝜅k and 𝜂t are municipality and year ﬁxed eﬀects and X ikt is a
ector of parent and child controls. The parameter of interest 𝛿 captures
he reduced form eﬀect of increases in child care access on parents’ la-
or supply. Given exogeneity, i.e. that changes in access are as good as
andom to changes in labor supply, this gives an unbiased estimate of
he average impact of an additional child care place on the labor supply
f parents. Such reduced form estimation will usually be most infor-
ative about the return to the public investment, and is as such often
egarded to give the most policy relevant estimates. Indeed, this is the
argin that is estimated in most papers in the literature on how child
are aﬀects parental labor supply, and we present these estimates below
or comparison with the existing literature. 
There are at least two reasons why accounting for the intensity is
mportant. in our setting. First, new child care places are typically cre-
ted in August, at the start of the school year. This mechanically gives
 maximum child care use of around 42% for most children, i.e. 5 out
f 12 months. 14 This should lead the reduced form to underestimate
he impact of a full year of child care access. Second, to the extent that
hild care places are not utilized to capacity, child care institutions have
uite extensive discretion to scale provision to actual use, by e.g. adjust-
ng employee hours. In this case, treating child care places as uniform
ndependent of utilization will overestimate the cost of child care provi-
ion. Note that this would imply that it is not correct in our case to use
he reduced form estimates to evaluate cost eﬃciency. 15 
Given that new child care places aﬀect labor supply of parents only
y aﬀecting the use of child care among parents, we can use an IV-
pproach to get an estimate of the impact of child care on labor supply
hich accounts for the intensity of treatment following the expansion.
his suggests the following IV-strategy: For each municipality and every
M. Eckhoﬀ Andresen and T. Havnes Labour Economics 61 (2019) 101762 
Fig. 4. The distribution of child care access for 2-year-olds across 
municipalities over 2002–2008. Note : The ﬁgure draws the mean 
child care coverage rate nationally over time (bullets and dashed 
line) and the distribution across municipalities (bars), weighted 
with population size. Data, estimation sample and variable deﬁni- 
tions are discussed in Section 3 . 
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(  ear, we instrument individual child care use over the year, m ikt , with
he child care coverage rate, CC kt . Speciﬁcally, we estimate the follow-
ng 2SLS-model in our sample of caregivers of 2-year old children: 16 
 𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚 𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝐗 𝑖𝑘𝑡 𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 (2)
 𝑖𝑘𝑡 = ?̃?𝑘 + ̃𝜏𝑡 + 𝜋𝐶𝐶 𝑘𝑡 + 𝐗 𝑖𝑘𝑡 𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 (3)
here 𝛼k and 𝜏 t are municipality and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Note that the
unicipality and year ﬁxed eﬀects, along with the rationing of the child
are market discussed above, ensures that we exploit variation only
rom newly opened child care places. In our baseline model, we include
ontrols for the vector X ikt which contains child and caregiver charac-
eristics: Child characteristics include dummies for gender and month
f birth, the number of older siblings, and dummies for both parents’
evel of completed education. 17 Caregiver characteristics include age,
ge squared, a dummy for immigrant background and the number of
hildren below ages 6, 11 and 18. We also include dummies for level of
ducation to control ﬂexibly for returns to education, including potential
heepskin eﬀects. Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported
n Table 2 . In our robustness analysis, we show that the overall pattern
f our estimates does not depend on the inclusion of controls. Standard
rrors are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedas-
icity. 
In the ﬁrst stage of the IV model, we regress our measure of child
are use over the year on municipal child care access. Our model there-
ore accounts for the intensity of child care induced by the child care
xpansion following the reform. Fig. 5 (a) clariﬁes the data used in our
rst stage in the main sample of cohabiting mothers. In the left panel,
e plot a dummy for whether the child used any child care in December
rom the cash-for-care register versus municipal child care access for our
ample of cohabiting mothers, which is from municipal reports in the
ame month. Data have been binned by percentile. As is evident from
he ﬁgure, the points line up closely along the diagonal, as expected,
nd with a correlation close to 1. 18 This indicates that the two measures16 All models are estimated using the Stata command reghdfe ( Correia, 2014 ). 
17 Rather than dropping a handful of observations with missing education data, 
e use a separate dummy for caregivers with missing education. 
18 The slight variation in the two measures could be due to a combination of 
easurement error, moves during the year, that some eligible parents do not 
pply for cash-for-care, that our sample does not include children with younger 
iblings or that some children attend care in neighboring municipalities. 
c
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o
dine up very well in December, verifying that our measure of child care
se is sound. 
In the middle panel of Fig. 5 (a), we perform the same analysis re-
lacing the binary December measure with the continuous measure of
hild care use over the entire year that we use in our main analysis.
his causes a downward shift which reﬂects that the average child who
as enrolled in child care in December did not use child care the entire
ear. Speciﬁcally, the child care places counted in December were uti-
ized on average only around 70% of the year. This average utilization
ate will reﬂect mostly children who enrolled for the ﬁrst time during
he year they turn 2 years old, but also the (relatively few) children who
ere enrolled part time. The correlation is still close to 1, however, in-
icating that the average place is utilized to roughly the same extent in
unicipalities both with low and with high levels of child care access. 
In the right panel of Fig. 5 (a), we have controlled for municipality
nd year ﬁxed eﬀects to get residualized measures of child care use and
ccess. This reﬂects the variation that we use in our IV-model, coming
rom newly opened child care places. As these mostly open in August, it
s no surprise that the children who occupy these slots in December use
ess child care than the average two-year old in care in December, who
ay have started in the previous year and attended child care through
he spring. Speciﬁcally, the association in the right panel indicates that
 newly opened child care slot causes about one half year of child care
se in that year. 19 
To understand more about the take-up of child care, Panel A of
ig. 6 shows the child care use of children in our sample between ages
4 and 35 months, separately for children born in diﬀerent months. For
xpositional clarity, we have highlighted children born in January. We
ee that these children are almost uniformly more likely to use child
are as they grow older. Importantly, we see that there is little take-up
ver the year, with the vast majority of children starting child care in
ugust: For children born in January, about 20% start child care in Au-
ust of the year they turn two years old (when they are 20 months of
ge) and a further 20% in August of the year they turn three years old
when they are 32 months of age). In comparison, only about 5% start
hild care in the intermediate months. 
A concern could be that many children use child care only part time,
nd perhaps expand their use during the year. In Panel B of Fig. 6 , we19 Note that the above discussion shows that we are not regressing individual 
utcomes on group means, as in a poorly designed peer eﬀects analysis. For a 
etailed discussion of why this should be a bad idea, see Angrist (2014) . 
M. Eckhoﬀ Andresen and T. Havnes Labour Economics 61 (2019) 101762 
Fig. 5. Individual child care use (top) and married and cohabiting mothers’ labor supply (bottom) vs. child care access. Note: Scatter plots of individual child care 
use (top) and outcomes (bottom) against child care coverage rates for 2-year olds, binned by percentile. For variables labeled “residual ”, we have removed year and 
municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. 
Fig. 6. Patterns of child care use across age and calendar months. Note: Panel a) plots the average share of child care users at child age 14 to 35 months of age by 
birth month. The graph for children born in January is highlighted for expositional ease. Panel b) depicts shares of children using part-time, full time or no child care 
by calendar month during the year they turn 2, inferred from cash-for-care data. “None ” indicates zero hours, “Part time ” indicates 0–40 h, and “Full time ” indicates 
40 or more hours. 
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20 Note that this relationship becomes mechanical when municipalities ap- 
proach full coverage. how the share of children in our sample who are enrolled in part time,
ull time and no child care in each calendar month of the year they turn
wo years old. Again, we note that the vast majority of children enroll
n August. Furthermore, we see that children are usually enrolled in full
ime care and that the share of part time use is relatively small and quite
table over the year. 
To illustrate the reduced form of our model, Fig. 5 (b) show scatter
lots for our three main outcomes against child care access after remov-
ng municipality and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We note that there is a strong
ositive association between child care access and labor supply, and that
he relationship is well approximated by a linear function, especially
or our measures of employment and full time-equivalent employment.
peciﬁcally, the correlation in the left panel suggests that the child care
xpansion increased earnings of cohabiting mothers by around 45,000
OK. Scaling this by the associated ﬁrst stage from above, yields an
V-estimate of around 89,000 NOK, close to the IV-estimates reported
elow. 
There are two potential selection issues when estimating our param-
ter of interest 𝛽. The ﬁrst is selection on gains: If parents in some mu-
icipalities respond more strongly to child care access than others, and
his is correlated with the child care expansion, then our estimates of
ow child care aﬀects parental labor supply will diﬀer from the average
ﬀect in the population. It will be a consistent estimator of the eﬀect
or the subpopulation that is aﬀected, but not for the whole popula-
ion. In the terminology of Imbens and Angrist (1994) , our estimate will
e a local average treatment eﬀect (LATE). In the presence of hetero-
eneous treatment eﬀects, our estimates reﬂect the average treatment
ﬀect among compliers, roughly parents of children that took up the
ewly available slots. We think this is a policy relevant group whether
r not they are representative of the population at large. 
Second, we could worry about selection on unobservables: If expan-
ions in child care access are, for instance, positively correlated with
ther determinants of labor supply, then our estimates will be biased
pwards. Note ﬁrst that the ﬁxed eﬀects will control for all time invari-
nt diﬀerences between municipalities, and for all common time shocks.
ur concerns should therefore be focused on changes in potential con-
ounders within municipalities . 
The most immediate threat to our identiﬁcation is arguably that child
are demand is driving the variation in child care access that we ex-
loit, which might bias our estimates upwards. In Section 3 above, we
iscussed this issue at some length, and concluded that this is unlikely,
ince demand is substantially higher than supply over the period we
tudy. To investigate this issue further, we now consider the patterns of
xpansions of care across municipalities. 
To illustrate our empirical approach we recenter the data so that
ear 0 is the year with the largest increase in child care access for each
unicipality. We then graph the changes in child care supply over time
longside changes in child care use and key outcome variables around
ear 0, after removing municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. To facilitate interpre-
ation, we have not removed year eﬀects. These trends are drawn in
ig. 7 . 
We start by considering the timing of events in panels (a)–(d) of
ig. 7 . If our strategy is sound, then we would expect that changes in
he labor supply of caregivers should follow changes in child care ac-
ess and not vice versa. The ﬁgure shows the association between child
are access (dashed line), on the one hand, and child care use and labor
upply (solid lines), on the other. By construction, we see a substantial
ncrease in child care access in year 0, with a jump of around 15 percent-
ge points in the coverage rate. This corresponds to a little under half of
he overall increase in child care access over the period we consider, so
ill represent a substantial fraction of the variation that we use in our
stimations below. Because we have not removed year eﬀects, it should
ot be surprising that the trend in child care access is positive also in
ther years. 
In panel (a) of Fig. 7 , we see that child care use follows closely the
rend in child care access, with a substantial jump in child care use inear 0. In panels (b)–(d), we further see that labor supply also increases
t the same time for both earnings and our measures of employment
nd full time-equivalent. In contrast, we see no indication of shocks in
he outcomes systematically preceding large expansions in child care ac-
ess. On the contrary, the trends in the outcomes are remarkably smooth
oth before and after year 0, lending support to our empirical strategy.
n panels (e)–(h) of Fig. 7 , we present similar graphs for key control vari-
bles. Since these can be controlled for, they do not pose a direct threat
o our estimates. Strong correlation between child care expansion and
bservable factors would, however, raise concern about potentially un-
orrelated time shocks. Unlike child care use and the labor supply out-
omes that we considered above, the controls change little around year
. This suggests that these variables are not driving the association be-
ween labor supply and child care. The exception is years of education,
here there is a slight increase at year 0. In practice, we will control
or all of these variables in our estimation, to guard against potential
mitted variables bias. 
Next, we check the balance of our sample across municipalities that
xpand child care access at diﬀerent times. To this end, we run a re-
ression of child care access for two year olds on municipality and year
xed eﬀects and a set of municipality characteristics measured in 2001,
efore the reform, interacted with year dummies: 
𝐶 𝑘𝑡 = 𝜌𝑘 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝝋 𝒕 𝑽 𝒌, 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏 + 𝜇𝑘𝑡 
here V k,2001 is a vector of pre-reform municipality characteristics.
ig. 8 plots coeﬃcients on the interactions between year and a set of
ey characteristics (see footnote 29 for details), denoted 𝝋 t above. A sys-
ematic relationship over time would suggest that municipalities of par-
icular types have a diﬀerent expansion proﬁle. Estimates are presented
n Fig. 8 and show that there is little systematic correlation with ini-
ial characteristics of the municipality. Unsurprisingly, low initial child
are access for 2-year olds has a strong relationship with the rollout of
ccess for this age group. 20 It is reassuring, however, that the rollout
ppears to be mostly uncorrelated with other municipality characteris-
ics. In particular, there is no indication of a relationship between the
ollout of child care and the initial level of female labor force participa-
ion. A particular concern might be that our estimates may be inﬂuenced
y changes in labor demand. Fig. 3 shows that the overall trend in em-
loyment, as measured by employment of working age women without
chool-aged children, was roughly ﬂat over the period we study (a simi-
ar picture can be drawn for male employment). While overall economic
rends cannot impact our ﬁxed eﬀects estimates in any case, we could
orry that diﬀerential economic changes across municipalities may be
orrelated with child care expansion and cause bias in our estimates.
ig. 8 shows that initial diﬀerences in municipality characteristics, in-
luding income and unemployment, does not seem to predict instrument
ollout. Finally, our estimates are stable to the inclusion or exclusion of a
ocal labor market control (municipal employment share of working age
en without school-aged children). We therefore conclude that diﬀer-
ntial growth in labor demand is unlikely to cause bias in our estimates.
Finally, even with the large set of control variables that we include in
ur model, one may still worry about changes in unobservable determi-
ants of labor supply. After our main results, we therefore further probe
he validity of our empirical strategy by assessing the stability of the IV-
stimates to alternative speciﬁcations, and by performing placebo tests.
hese speciﬁcation checks by and large lend support to our estimation
trategy. 
. Results 
Table 4 shows the reduced form estimates from our model among the
our main groups of caregivers. Focusing on cohabiting mothers, an ad-
itional slot in child care leads to increases in earnings of around 31,000
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Fig. 7. Event study graphs for cohabiting mothers: Changes in treatment (top left) and outcomes around the time of the largest growth in child care access Note: The 
ﬁgure graphs outcomes, treatment and controls over time after removing municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. Data are recentered so that year 0 is the year with the largest 
growth in child care coverage rates for each municipality after netting out yearly shocks. The left axes (solid lines) is sized to go from − 0.4 to 0.4 standard deviations 
of the variable in the sample of cohabiting mothers, but labels still indicate absolute values of the variable. The scale of the child care coverage rate(right axis, dashed 
line) is in percentage points. Data, estimation sample and variable deﬁnitions are discussed in Section 3 . More details in online appendix. 
Fig. 8. What predicts timing of child care expansion? Note: The ﬁgure plots estimates from a regression of the child care coverage rate on municipality and time 
ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of pre-reform characteristics interacted with year dummies. Plotted are the coeﬃcients on the interaction of the characteristics (measured in 
2001) with time, which can be interpreted as the diﬀerence in expansion of child care for a municipality with one unit higher level of that characteristic in 2001 
in a particular year to the average expansion that year. Free income per capita and population have been standardized so that the units are in standard deviations. 
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality. See footnote 29 for a list of characteristics. 
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Table 4 
Reduced form estimates of the eﬀect of an extra child care slot on annual labor 
market outcomes. 
Cohabiting Cohabiting Single Non-residing 
mothers fathers mothers fathers 
Earnings 31.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.33 − 10.9 − 2.19 
(5.71) (17.9) (10.3) (23.4) 
221.3 477.2 102.1 304.9 
Taxes 4.20 − 9.51 − 14.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.57 
(2.66) (10.2) (4.86) (10.9) 
57.8 139.9 28.1 82.9 
Transfers − 0.30 0.35 20.7 ∗ ∗ 6.84 
excl. cash for care (2.03) (2.28) (8.41) (7.18) 
66.8 17.4 209.5 47.2 
Employed 0.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.011 0.0097 0.046 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.033) (0.040) 
0.63 0.92 0.29 0.72 
Full-time 0.081 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0055 − 0.036 0.037 
(0.017) (0.012) (0.023) (0.039) 
0.35 0.85 0.13 0.56 
Weeks of above 4h 4.91 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.55 1.74 − 0.48 
employment (0.56) (0.66) (1.72) (1.96) 
35.0 43.4 19.5 31.7 
above 30h 5.16 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.65 − 1.90 0.19 
(0.62) (0.73) (1.50) (2.02) 
23.5 41.6 11.5 28.8 
285,860 285,670 33,561 29,272 
Note: Reduced form estimates of the outcomes as listed in row headers on the instru- 
ment (child care access), ﬁxed eﬀects and controls. Pre-reform means of outcomes 
are underlined and refer to grandparents of 2-year olds in 2002. ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ 
(p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗ (p < 0.01) 
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22 It is common to take logs of the dependent variable in order to interpret 
the estimates as percentage changes. The presence of zeros in the outcome and 
the fact that the shift into employment is an important margin of response to 
child care makes this unattractive in our case. Other alternatives, relying on 
various more or less arbitrary transformations of the outcome variable that in- 
volve adding a small number to all observations before taking logs, in practice OK, 15 percentage points increased probability of being employed
nd 8 percentage points increased probability of full time-equivalent
mployment. As discussed, because new child care places are usually
pened in August, these estimates will capture only a part year eﬀect of
he increase in child care access. Eﬀects on our yearly measures of labor
upply are therefore likely to understate the eﬀect of a full year of child
are use. To correctly interpret these estimates, we should correct for
he intensity of the treatment that parents experience. 
We thus turn to our IV-model to get estimates that more correctly
cales the reduced form impact. Baseline results from equations (2) and
3) for the four main samples of interest are reported in Table 5 . In panel
, we report estimates from our ﬁrst stage. The instrument is relevant
nd strong, with F -statistics on the excluded instrument above 50 in all
amples. Estimates in panel A indicate that new child care places are
tilized on average about 43–47% of a full year, i.e.the equivalent of
bout ﬁve to ﬁve and a half months in that year. Notice that the scaling
f the reduced form estimate implied by this ﬁrst stage estimate turns
ut to match well with the basic scaling to potential treatment that we
iscussed above. This suggests that utilization of new child care places
s close to saturation in the months when they are available. Looking
cross groups, coeﬃcients are similar, suggesting that the take-up of
hild care slots is relatively homogeneous across children with diﬀerent
iving arrangements. 
In panel B of Table 5 , we report IV-estimates for a number of diﬀerent
utcomes, where estimates on child care use are from separate regres-
ions for each outcome. The estimates should be interpreted as the eﬀect
f adding a new child care place which is utilized to saturation over the
ear. Our ﬁrst stage estimates suggest that the diﬀerence between these
stimates and the estimates in Table 4 above, are mostly driven by the
ddition of new places in August rather than at the start of the year. As a
oint of reference, we also include in Table 5 the mean of the dependent
ariable in 2002, prior to the child care expansion (underlined). 21 21 OLS-estimates are reported in the online appendix for comparison. These 
stimates are much larger than our IV-estimates, in line with our intuition that 
others who work more have higher demand for child care. 
p
t
s
e
tOur IV-estimates suggest substantial labor supply responses among
he large group of cohabiting mothers . In particular, employment
nd full time-equivalent employment among cohabiting mothers is esti-
ated to increase by 32 and 17 percentage points, respectively. Similar
esults are found for weeks of employment from the matched employer–
mployee register. Compared to the pre-reform means, these eﬀects im-
ly an increase of around 50% in the mean employment rates of co-
abiting mothers of two year olds. These strong responses suggest that
hild care plays an important role in getting mothers of small children
back) into the labor market. In line with the ﬁndings below of persis-
ent eﬀects the following year, we interpret these results as driven by
astening the return to more or less full time work rather than eﬀects
t the intensive margin of labor supply. 
When we consider earnings of cohabiting mothers directly, our es-
imates indicate that child care use caused an increase of about 66,000
OK per year, a 30% increase over the pre-reform mean. 22 At the same
ime, we estimate that taxes paid increase by an insigniﬁcant 9,000
OK, while there is no eﬀect on transfers. Taking the ratio of the (in-
igniﬁcant) estimate of 9000 NOK increased taxes to the 66,000 NOK
ncreased earnings yields a very low average tax rate on the additional
arnings of around 13.5%, close to half of the average tax rates of these
others before the reform. This is likely caused by nonlinearities in the
ax schedule that makes the marginal tax rate diﬀerent from the aver-
ge tax rate, particularly for low earnings. This means that simple back-uts large weights on small changes close to zero. The inverse hyperbolic sine 
ransformation is arguably less extreme in this case, but still strongly empha- 
izes changes in the lower part of the distribution. In line with this, estimated 
lasticities for both single and cohabiting mothers are very large when we apply 
his transformation. 
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24 Note that the evidence here is suggestive, since the estimates will reﬂect f-the-envelope calculations may overestimate the extent to which the
osts of child care subsidies are oﬀset by increases in tax revenue. 
The estimates for cohabiting fathers show no evidence of labor sup-
ly responses to child care, with precise point estimates close to zero
nd insigniﬁcant for all outcomes. This is in line with ﬁndings in pre-
ious literature and the contention that father’s labor supply is largely
ndependent of the family situation. Also in modern Norway, it seems,
others are the primary caregiver and stay home with the child when
hild care is not available. 
Our point estimates for cohabiting mothers imply an increase in after
ax income of around 57,000 NOK. This ignores, however, the mechani-
al reduction of the cash-for-care beneﬁt which, at around 50,000 NOK,
argely cancels out the increased earnings in the ﬁrst year. To verify this
ormally, we have also included estimates on disposable income directly.
hese estimates conﬁrm that the total eﬀect on households’ ﬁnances is
oughly null. Add to this the co-payment for child care, at about 40,000
OK per year, and it is clear that child care is actually quite costly to
arents even when increased earnings are taken into account. This sug-
ests that there are non-pecuniary beneﬁts associated with work or that
uture beneﬁts of returning to work early are substantial. While we do
ot have data to investigate the former, we investigate persistence in
he labor supply response below. 
Turning to single mothers , the point estimates in column 3 of
able 5 are not suﬃciently precise to allow for strong conclusions about
he labor supply eﬀects. As we see below, however, the mean impact
eems to hide substantial heterogeneity over the earnings distribution,
ith positive impacts at the bottom and negative eﬀects at the top.
eanwhile, the estimated eﬀects on taxes and transfers are surprisingly
arge, with an estimated drop in taxes paid of about 30,000 NOK and an
ncrease in transfers of nearly 50,000 NOK. A potential explanation for
hese results is that child care allows single mothers to (barely) meet the
ctivity requirements linked to the transitional beneﬁt for single moth-
rs. 23 Note, however, that the results for single mothers are less robust
o our speciﬁcation checks below, suggesting that we should be careful
n putting to much emphasis on these results. 
Estimates for non-residing fathers are not suﬃciently precise to
raw ﬁrm conclusions, but are in general close to zero, lending little
upport to child care as an important driver of labor supply decisions
or this group. 
We have also investigated the labor supply response of grandpar-
nts , under the hypothesis that grandparents may be relevant informal
aregivers for young children. If so, and if grandparents are still attached
o the labor market, we would expect to see eﬀects on the labor supply
f working age grandparents. Estimates for these groupds are reported
n the online appendix, and suggest that there is no response among ma-
ernal grandparents, but modest eﬀects on the labor supply of paternal
randparents. Interestingly, while paternal grandmothers work more,
aternal grandfathers work less when the child is in child care. This
ay suggest that paternal grandmothers are important informal care-
ivers to some 2-year olds, while there is an indirect income eﬀect on
randfathers. 
We can use our results to calculate the net contemporaneous ﬁscal
ost to the government of an additional child in full time care at the time
f enrollment. We do this for the current year only, but note that we
stimate persistence in the labor supply response below, ﬁnding little
vidence of increased taxes in the following year, indicating that any
mpact of persistence on these calculations should be relatively minor.
sing 2017-prices and 2008 as the base year, the state subsidies for one
ull time child in care was 107,500 NOK. In addition, the municipalities23 The transitional beneﬁt ( “overgangsstønad ”) is paid to single mothers who 
re at least 50% employed, in work-related training or actively searching for a 
ob. The transitional beneﬁt is 2.25 times the basic amount, i.e. about 210,000 
OK per year. The beneﬁt is subject to regular income tax and is reduced by 
5% of any income above 0.5 basic amounts. 
t
t
a
n
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r
K
oovered on average 28.4% of the total subsidies to the sector, adding
p to an estimated 150,000 NOK in state and municipal subsidies. The
ncreased taxes from the additional labor supply of cohabiting mothers
s 9000 NOK, meaning that around 6% of the costs of the subsidies are
ﬀset by increased tax revenues. In addition, the cash for care beneﬁts
re mechanically reduced by around 50,000 NOK, increasing the share
f cost oﬀset to around 39%. Note that this ignores the negative, but
nsigniﬁcant impact, on father’s taxes, which would drive this number
own. 
.1. Heterogeneity over the earnings distribution 
Providing low-cost child care can also be a tool to level the play-
ng ﬁeld between families from diﬀerent backgrounds. To investigate
his, we construct dummy variables for earnings brackets based on the
ame basic amounts we used to construct our measures of employment
around 94,000 NOK). Speciﬁcally, we construct seven mutually exclu-
ive dummy variables that are equal to one if earnings fall below one
asic amount, between one and two basic amounts, between two and
hree basic amounts, and so on, with the last category being earnings
bove six basic amounts (around 564,000 NOK). We then estimate our
V-model using these dummy variables successively as dependent vari-
bles. This allows us to study binned parts of the marginal distribution
f earnings to get an impression of what parts of the distribution are af-
ected by the child care expansion. 24 Since the overall impact on fathers
s small, we consider only mothers in this exercise. 
Fig. 9 shows the marginal distribution in 2002, i.e. the mean of our
ummy variables, as bullets. The IV-estimate is represented in bars with
ssociated conﬁdence intervals. In the left panel, we report estimates
or cohabiting mothers. The bullets (measured on the right axis) show
hat prior to the child care expansion, almost 25% of cohabiting moth-
rs earned below one basic amount, leaving them essentially out of the
abor force. For the remaining cohabiting mothers, the distribution of
arnings was relatively ﬂat, with 10–15% in each bracket. In contrast,
he distribution for single mothers reported in the right panel of Fig. 9 is
eavily skewed, with 62% in the lowest earnings bracket and population
hares below 10% and steadily declining as we move up the distribution.
The bars in Fig. 9 (measured on the left axis) give the estimated im-
act of child care use on the probability of ending up in each bracket,
nd reveal strong heterogeneity. In particular, cohabiting mothers seem
o be shifting away from both of the two lowest brackets, and into the
wo middle brackets close to the threshold for full time-equivalent em-
loyment that we used above. The insigniﬁcant point estimate on the
ean earnings of single mothers above, turns out to hide substantial
eterogeneity over the earnings distribution. Estimates in Fig. 9 sug-
est that single mothers shift away from the lowest bracket and into
he lower middle brackets, pointing towards an increased incidence of
mall part time (or low wage) employment, but also away from the top
racket, though estimates are less precise in this smaller sample. 
.2. Persistence 
Though estimated impacts on earnings, transfers and taxes did not
upport the notion of child care as a public ﬁnance boon in the short
un, we may question whether there are long run eﬀects that can help
itigate the costs. We therefore investigate whether there is persistencehe eﬀect on the distribution, not the distribution of eﬀects. That is, though 
he estimates are suﬃcient to conclude about how the child care expansion 
ﬀected the distribution overall, and hence for most welfare analyses, they do 
ot provide information about the number of winners and losers or the size of 
ndividual gains or losses, unless we are willing to make the bold assumption of 
ank invariance (i.e. no reshuﬄing in the distribution with treatment). See e.g. 
oenker and Hallock (2001) or Koenker et al. (2017) for extensive discussions 
f these issues. 
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Fig. 9. The impact of child care use on the earnings distribution of mothers. Note: Estimates are from equations (2) and (3) . Outcome and control variables are 
deﬁned in Section 3 . 95% conﬁdence intervals are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity. Pre-reform means refer to parents of 2-year 
olds in 2002. 
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o  n the labor supply response. To this end, we use the outcome variables
easured one to four years into the future. 25 Notice that we maintain
he conditioning on control variables from year t in order to avoid is-
ues associated with so-called “bad control ” variables. 26 Speciﬁcally, we
stimate the following 2nd stage equation. 
 𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝑠 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠 𝑚 𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝐗 𝑖𝑘𝑡 𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 (4)
here 𝑦 𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝑠 and 𝛽s is the outcome and the eﬀect of child care use, re-
pectively, s years after the child turned two years old. 𝛽s captures the
ull eﬀect of the expansion-induced increase in child care use on future
abor supply. For brevity, and because estimates are not suﬃciently pre-
ise on other groups, we focus on cohabiting mothers. Estimates for the
ther groups may be found in the online appendix. 
Table 6 presents estimates from the IV model for cohabiting mothers.
olumn 2 presents estimates from the baseline model for comparison,
hile columns 3–6 present results on labor supply measured at child
ge 3 to 6l. While eﬀects fade out over time, our estimates suggest that
here is relatively strong persistence over the ﬁrst years following child
are expansion. In particular, the impact on earnings is about the same
n year 𝑡 + 1 as in year t. Note, however that this is partly due to the fact
hat the school year straddles the years t and 𝑡 + 1 , such that, in practice,25 Because the expansion of child care for 2-year olds may aﬀect labor supply 
oth through the persistence of labor supply, e.g. through increased experience, 
t may also have an indirect impact by raising child care use at later ages. Unfor- 
unately, we can only measure individual child care use up until the age of 35 
r 36 months, and so are unable to address this concern directly. This does not, 
owever, have any bearing on the reduced form, but the IV-estimates should be 
nterpreted with some care. 
26 Some of the controls, like education, could be considered endogenous to 
hild care access. This is more likely the longer the time period between the 
reatment and the outcome. See Angrist and Pischke (2008) for a discussion of 
ad controls. 
t
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𝑡he child care expansion will be of similar magnitude in the two years. 27 
he impact on taxes is also roughly the same as in year t, suggesting that
he marginal tax rates on the extra income in year t+1 is very similar
o year t at around 15%. 
The fact that the coeﬃcients for employment and full time is al-
ost equal in year 𝑡 + 1 suggests that the eﬀects we have found so far
s driven by mothers returning to full time work, not to part time work.
stimates drop signiﬁcantly in 𝑡 + 2 , and are mostly insigniﬁcant from
 + 3 onwards. Nonetheless, this provides evidence of persistence in la-
or market response to child care start throughout the child’s preschool
ears, which might be driven by child care largely being an absorbing
tate. All estimates are insigniﬁcant by year 𝑡 + 4 , when the child turns
 and enters primary school. Although not as long lasting as the eﬀects
rom Haeck et al. (2015) or Lefebvre et al. (2009) , this supports the
ndings from these papers that child care may have eﬀects on maternal
abor supply that outlast the period of actual use. 
Fig. 10 illustrates our persistence estimates for cohabiting mothers
y predicting outcomes with and without child care use and comparing
his to the actual trend for pre-reform mothers. Speciﬁcally, we construct
he following variable to predict counterfactual labor supply for mothers
f 2-year olds in 2002 s years later, where 𝛽𝑠 is from Table 6 and m it is
he actual care use. 
̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑠 ( 𝑚 ) = 𝑦 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠 ( 𝑚 − 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 ) (5)
f a child used no child care in 2002, then 𝑚 = 0 and we eﬀectively sub-
ract the predicted eﬀect of the child care use in 2002. If they had used
ull child care in 2002, then 𝑚 = 1 and we eﬀectively add the predicted27 Panel A of Fig. 6 shows that most children start child care one year later, 
n August of the year they turn 3 years old. The policy should therefore shift 
arents into about the same amount of child care use in years t (Aug–Dec) and 
 + 1 (Jan–June). 
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Table 5 
IV-results: The impact of full-year child care use on annual labor supply. 
Cohabiting Cohabiting Single Non-residing 
mothers fathers mothers fathers 
A. First stage 
Child care access 0.47 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.47 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.044) (0.042) (0.059) (0.051) 
F 114.9 122.4 51.8 68.9 
B. Second stage 
Earnings 65.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.70 − 25.5 − 5.15 
(1,000 NOK) (15.8) (38.2) (24.2) (55.2) 
221.3 477.2 102.1 304.9 
Disposable income 2.14 20.6 3.6 − 1.83 
(1,000 NOK) (7.96) (18.3) (18.0) (38.1) 
263.2 355.8 316.0 269.6 
Tax 8.92 − 20.3 − 33.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.1 
(1,000 NOK) (6.23) (20.2) (9.44) (25.3) 
57.8 139.9 28.1 82.9 
Transfers, − 0.64 0.74 48.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 16.1 
excl. cash for care (4.34) (4.82) (18.5) (16.6) 
(1,000 NOK) 66.8 17.4 209.5 47.2 
Employed 0.32 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 0.023 0.11 
(0.027) (0.020) (0.076) (0.096) 
0.63 0.92 0.29 0.72 
Full-time 0.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.012 − 0.084 0.087 
equivalent (0.027) (0.025) (0.057) (0.092) 
0.35 0.85 0.13 0.56 
Weeks of 4 h 10.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.17 4.06 − 1.14 
employment (1.70) (1.34) (4.19) (4.59) 
above 35.0 43.4 19.5 31.7 
30 h 11.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.38 − 4.45 0.45 
(1.33) (1.49) (3.56) (4.76) 
23.5 41.6 11.5 28.8 
Observations 285,860 285,670 33,561 29,542 
Note: Estimates are from equations (2) and (3) . Outcome and control variables are 
deﬁned in Section 3 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality 
level and robust to heteroskedasticity. Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined 
and refer to parents of 2-year olds born in 2002. Monetary values in 1,000s of 2017 
NOK. ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗ (p < 0.01) 
Table 6 
Persistence: IV impacts of a full year of child care use on annual, lagged outcomes, 
cohabiting mothers. 
Outcome t (baseline) 𝑡 + 1 𝑡 + 2 𝑡 + 3 𝑡 + 4 
Earnings 65.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 62.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.5 ∗ 1.86 − 8.78 
(1,000 NOK) (15.8) (17.9) (11.7) (12.3) (13.5) 
221.3 296.1 311.8 330.1 350.6 
Tax 8.92 9.37 − 0.41 − 2.60 0.70 
(6.23) (6.03) (5.06) (5.37) (7.01) 
57.8 75.4 79.4 85.0 92.2 
Transfers − 0.64 − 5.17 − 4.11 11.0 ∗ 8.73 
excl. cash for care (4.34) (5.83) (6.20) (5.88) (5.46) 
66.8 66.6 69.7 70.2 71.0 
Employed 0.32 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.26 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.14 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.094 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.029 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.025) (0.031) (0.028) 
0.63 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.80 
Full time- 0.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.098 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.079 ∗ ∗ 0.045 
equivalent (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) 
0.35 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.54 
Weeks of 4 h 10.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.77 − 1.49 
employment (1.70) (1.65) (1.18) (2.55) (3.89) 
above 35.0 38.3 38.8 41.3 43.4 
30 h 11.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.34 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.84 1.22 
(1.33) (1.56) (1.34) (2.85) (4.46) 
23.5 27.4 27.8 29.9 31.6 
Observations 285,860 284,641 283,833 283,267 282,769 
Note: Estimates are from equation (2) , with outcomes measured 1–4 years later. Stan- 
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to het- 
eroskedasticity. Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined and refer to parents 
of 2-year olds in 2002. Monetary values in 1,000s of 2017 NOK. ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ 
(p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗ (p < 0.01) 
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Fig. 10. Persistence: Labor supply of cohabiting mothers around birth, pre-reform means and counterfactuals with no and full child care use at age 2. Note: To 
construct the graph, we apply the÷ estimates from our baseline and persistence model in Equation (5) , cf. Table 5 . The solid line plots predicted labor supply of 
cohabiting mothers of children born in 2000 if child care use had stayed at the observed 2002-level, i.e. 𝑚 = 0 . 32 in Equation (5) . The lower dashed line subtracts 
from the solid line the estimated eﬀect of child care use of 2-year olds, i.e. 𝑚 = 0 in Equation (5) . The upper dotted line adds the eﬀect of increasing to full child care 
use at age 2, i.e. 𝑚 = 1 in Equation (5) . 
e  
c  
2  
e  
c  
p  
p  
c
 
e  
n  
t  
4  
f  
w  
ﬁ  
t  
1
p
m
c
m
t  
m  
l  
w
6
 
t  
I  
n  
m  
m  
c
6ﬀect of increasing child care use from the observed level in 2002. For
omparison, we also plot outcomes using the mean child care use in
002 ( 𝑚 = 0 . 32 ). Note that this should be interpreted as the predicted
ﬀect for a complier around this level, not the overall eﬀect of full child
are access. Because eﬀects are likely to be diﬀerent outside of the com-
lier group, particularly in the group of never-takers, who might be ex-
ected to be less strongly attached to the labor market, we should be
autious about extrapolating to the population at large. 
Fig. 10 shows the estimated time series for the mean of earnings,
mployment and full-time equivalent employment for mothers. We ﬁrst
ote that while about 75% of mothers are employed prior to birth, less
han 65% are employed in the year following birth. Similarly, around
5% of mothers work full time prior to birth while about 30% work
ull time in the year following birth. This is reﬂected in their earnings,
hich drop by about 20% on average in the year following birth. 28 The
gure illustrates how the increase in child care use at age 2 caused by
he reform is predicted to have hastened mothers’ return to work, and28 Note that the generous Norwegian parental leave arrangements, see footnote 
3, may explain why earnings and measures of employment don’t fall further: In 
ractice, almost all Norwegian mothers take several months of parental leave, 
any for more than a year, with up to 44 (54) weeks of 100% (80%) wage 
ompensation in our sample. Parental leave beneﬁts are included in our earnings 
easure. 
 
s  
a  
s  
w  
t  
i  
l  hat eﬀects are persistent, as mothers stay more attached to the labor
arket also in the following years. Note that the large drop in predicted
abor supply without child care at age 2 should not be surprising, as
age compensation expires at most 54 weeks after birth. 
. Speciﬁcation checks 
Despite the reform and the undersupply of formal care in the period,
he expansion in child care that we exploit is, of course, not randomized.
n this section, we challenge our empirical strategy and investigate alter-
ative explanations for our ﬁndings. Speciﬁcation checks for cohabiting
others are reported in Table 7 . For brevity, results for other groups
ay be found in the online appendix. Overall, robustness checks for
ohabiting mothers support our empirical strategy. 
.1. Common time trends 
The basic identifying assumption in our study rests on common time
hocks across municipalities with diﬀerent growth rates in child care
ccess. We report a series of speciﬁcation checks challenging this as-
umption in panel A of Table 7 . We ﬁrst perform a placebo test where
e use as the outcome the labor supply of mothers in year 𝑡 − 4 , i.e.
wo years before giving birth, which should not be aﬀected by changes
n child care access that occur several years later and should be unre-
ated to pregnancy. If our estimates are, in contrast, picking up secular
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Table 7 
Speciﬁcation checks: IV results of a full year of child care use on annual labor supply. 
Earnings Empl. Full time Weeks > 4h Weeks > 30h N 
No controls 88.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 285,860 
(24.3) (0.036) (0.029) (2.32) (1.86) 
Controlling for lagged 50.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.28 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.68 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.44 ∗ ∗ ∗ 279,996 
dependent var. ( 𝑡 − 3 ) (14.8) (0.027) (0.027) (1.74) (1.62) 
A. Common time trends 
Placebo: Outcome 1.80 0.069 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.029 3.01 ∗ ∗ 3.27 ∗ 274,644 
in 𝑡 − 4 (9.93) (0.025) (0.026) (1.27) (1.86) 
Municipality-speciﬁc 91.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.33 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 285,860 
linear time trends (18.2) (0.054) (0.049) (2.41) (2.64) 
Municipality-speciﬁc 94.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.34 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.19 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 17.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 285,860 
quadratic time trends (22.3) (0.064) (0.063) (3.06) (3.38) 
Interacted 99.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.31 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.18 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 285,555 
time shocks (14.8) (0.043) (0.040) (1.90) (2.08) 
B. Reverse causality: Excess demand (2004–2008 only) 
Any waiting lists 83.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.31 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.18 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.51 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 202,261 
(15.1) (0.038) (0.041) (1.64) (1.84) 
Waiting lists above 10 77.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.24 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.27 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.50 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.07 ∗ ∗ ∗ 118,351 
percent of population (22.4) (0.051) (0.049) (1.72) (1.81) 
C. Alternative drivers 
Endogenous fertility: 57.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.29 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.90 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.41 ∗ ∗ ∗ 346,309 
include younger siblings (15.6) (0.026) (0.026) (1.39) (1.27) 
Population growth: 83.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.32 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.18 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 285,690 
instrument = log ( slots ) (16.3) (0.039) (0.035) (1.94) (1.93) 
Control for child care 74.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.33 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.19 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 285,860 
access for older kids (14.5) (0.029) (0.029) (1.72) (1.48) 
Selective migration: 51.4 ∗ ∗ 0.34 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.16 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.22 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 274,630 
residence ﬁxed in 𝑡 − 3 (23.0) (0.032) (0.032) (1.68) (1.80) 
D. Family-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects 
Baseline, 64.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.63 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.64 ∗ ∗ ∗ 71,509 
sample > 2 children (17.0) (0.044) (0.047) (1.76) (2.25) 
Individual ﬁxed effects 49.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.19 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.62 ∗ 3.78 71,509 
sample > 2 children (15.2) (0.050) (0.053) (1.94) (2.35) 
Note: The table reports IV-estimates on child care use from a series of speciﬁcation checks described in 
the main text for cohabiting mothers. Speciﬁcation checks for other caregivers are provided in the online 
appendix. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedas- 
ticity. Monetary values in 1,000s of 2017 NOK. ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗ (p < 0.01) 
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29 Speciﬁcally, we include the share of left wing representatives in the munic- 
ipal council, a dummy for left wing majority, the share of women in the munic- 
ipal council, the non-earmarked income per capita in the municipal accounts, a 
dummy for municipalities with hydropower income, the share of the population 
living in urban areas, the initial female labor force participation, initial levels 
of child care access and population. 
30 Note that baseline results for 2004–2008 are very close to results for the full 
period. iﬀerences in the growth of maternal labor supply over time which is
orrelated with child care access, then we would expect the placebo es-
imates to yield eﬀects that go in the same direction as estimates using
ontemporaneous outcomes. The placebo estimates are small for most
utcomes, supporting our estimation strategy. We note, however, some
igniﬁcant impacts for the employment margin which may be a worry.
his estimate is, however, substantially smaller than our baseline re-
ults. 
We next allow for diﬀerent time trends in diﬀerent municipalities.
n the second and third rows of panel A, we admit municipality-speciﬁc
ime trends by including a linear time trend (row 2) and a linear and
uadratic time trend (row 3) as controls in our baseline speciﬁcation.
eassuringly, our estimates are stable to this inclusion, and are, if any-
hing, larger than in the baseline. 
Of course, we cannot be sure that unobserved trends are linear or
uadratic. In row 4 of panel A, we instead allow for diﬀerent time shocks
o labor supply depending on pre-reform characteristics of each munic-
pality. Note that we cannot include year-by-municipality ﬁxed eﬀects,
ince this is the variation we exploit in our identiﬁcation strategy. In-
tead, we interact the yearly shocks with pre-reform characteristics, es-
imating the following speciﬁcation. 
 𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚 𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝝋 𝒕 𝑽 𝒌, 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏 + 𝑿 𝒊𝒌𝒕 𝜽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 (6)
 𝑖𝑘𝑡 = ?̃?𝑘 + ̃𝜏𝑡 + 𝜋𝐶𝐶 𝑘𝑡 + ?̃? 𝒕 𝑽 𝒌, 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏 + 𝑿 𝒊𝒌𝒕 ?̃? + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 (7)
here 𝜑 t is the time-varying coeﬃcient on the prereform characteris-
ics, denoted V k,2001 . In this set we include a range of political, economicnd geographic characteristics measured in 2001, before the sample
eriod. 29 . Again, we ﬁnd that our estimates are stable to this inclusion,
f. the fourth row in panel A of Table 7 . 
.2. Excess demand 
Our empirical strategy relies on growth in child care access being un-
orrelated to growth in labor supply within municipalities. As discussed
n Section 4 , a potential worry could be that markets are not rationed,
n which case growth in child care access could be driven by increased
emand, and not vice versa. To investigate this, we narrow down our
ample to municipalities with signiﬁcant excess demand, where such
everse causality should be less of an issue. To this end, we exploit the
ata on waiting lists for 0–2 year olds. In panel B of Table 7 , we reduce
ur sample ﬁrst to municipality-years with children on the waiting lists
nd then further to municipality-years where waiting lists make up at
east 10% of the children below 3 years in the municipality, and run our
aseline model for the available years 2004–2008, when data on wait-
ng lists are available. 30 Estimates in Panel B are similar to our baseline
stimates. 
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p  .3. Alternative drivers 
In panel C of Table 7 , we investigate some alternative drivers that
ight explain our estimates. First, if caregivers with high levels of labor
upply move to municipalities that will expand child care, our estimates
ould be driven by selective migration. To test for this, we ignore recent
hanges of residence: We consider a mother’s municipality of residence
o be the one where she resided in year 𝑡 − 3 , the year before giving birth.
f selective migration was driving the results, we should see estimates
ropping towards zero as we limit this possibility. In contrast, estimates
re relatively stable. We have also estimated our IV-model using as the
ependent variable a dummy for whether the mother moves to a dif-
erent municipality between the year before birth and the year when
he child turns two. This gives no indication that selective migration is
ikely to be important in our setting. 
Second, in line with previous literature we have considered the
oungest child. If fertility is endogenous to child care availability this re-
triction might imply conditioning on an endogenous variable and could
ias our estimates. To check whether this might be driving our results,
e rerun the baseline speciﬁcation, including also mothers that have
ounger children. Estimates are almost unchanged. 
Third, our instrument is constructed as the ratio of children in care
o the population of the same age. Changes in these rates could be
riven both by changes in population as well as changes in the sup-
ly of care. If population growth drives labor supply, or if, as above,
hild care availability increases fertility, then this could cause bias in
ur estimates. To investigate this, we change our speciﬁcation by us-
ng the log of the number of places in care as the instrument. The esti-
ates in row 3 in panel C of Table 7 are again similar to our baseline
stimates. 
Fourth, we might worry that a contemporary expansion among older
hildren confounds the estimates. We see from Fig. 1 (a) that the reform
s associated with (smaller) increases in the child care access also for
–5 year olds, and these children might have younger siblings in our
ample. If the child care use of these children correlates with that of their
ounger siblings and also aﬀects maternal labor supply, our estimates
ould be biased upwards. Our estimates does not move when we include
 control for child care access for 3–5 year old children. 
.4. Family ﬁxed eﬀects 
Our municipality ﬁxed eﬀects account for all time-invariant determi-
ants of labor supply at the municipality level and from individual char-
cteristics for which the composition across municipalities is ﬁxed over
ime. However, if the composition changes over time, and the changes in
hese characteristics correlate with the child care expansion, our results
ight be biased. 
To check this, panel D of Table 7 reports estimates from a model
ith family-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. This exploits that some parents have
ore than one child in the sample period to compare parental labor sup-
ly outcomes across siblings, where one child is exposed to lower child
are access than the other. By relating the change in labor supply to the
hange in child care access within families, we can hold constant all ob-
ervable and unobservable characteristics that are ﬁxed within families
ver time. 
Because parents with multiple children inthe sample period may
e diﬀerent from the rest of the sample, we ﬁrst rerun our baseline
peciﬁcation on this sample. To maintain clustering at the municipal-
ty level, we include only mothers who reside in the same munici-
ality at each birth. The results in panel D show that in the reduced
ample our baseline model yields estimates that are almost identical
o the baseline. When we include family ﬁxed eﬀects, estimates are
omewhat smaller but still quite similar and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
rom baseline estimates. This indicates that our main results are un-
ikely to be driven by changes in the composition of individuals across
unicipalities. . Conclusion 
We investigate the labor supply eﬀects of the use of child care for
oddlers following a Norwegian reform in 2002, exploiting the stag-
ered expansion of child care across municipalities. To guard against
ndogeneity problems, we instrument individual child care use with ra-
ioned municipal child care access, controlling for municipality and year
xed eﬀects to exploit only changes in availability of care. Our approach
s supported by a battery of robustness tests that investigate alternative
xplanations for our ﬁndings. The information on child care use that we
xploit ensures that our estimates represent the eﬀect of a full year of
hild care use. This is important because newly expanded slots are not
xploited to capacity in the ﬁrst year, largely because they are usually
pened in the middle of the year. In practice, our estimates suggest that
ake-up of new child care places is in fact roughly complete in the period
fter they are opened. 
Results show relatively large labor supply responses among moth-
rs of toddlers compared to most of the existing literature. Cohabiting
others seem to respond by moving from no or little employment to
ore or less full-time work: We ﬁnd an elasticity of labor force partici-
ation with respect to child care use of around 0.32, indicating that for
very 10 cohabiting mothers induced to use full time care by the ex-
ansion, 3 more mothers will be employed than would be the case had
hey used no care at all. These estimates should be compared to the pre-
eform means: Before the reform, 63% had at least substantial part-time
ork. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant and positive eﬀects on full time employ-
ent and income, but ﬁnd contradicting and insigniﬁcant estimates for
ingle mothers. 
We also investigate the response on total tax payments from mothers
nd fathers to assess the degree to which increases in the tax base can
ﬀset some of the costs of the subsidy. We ﬁnd relatively small and in-
igniﬁcant eﬀects on tax revenue, corresponding to a marginal tax rate
f about 14% on the extra 66,000 NOK earnings for cohabiting mothers.
his is around half of the average tax rate paid by our sample of moth-
rs before the reform, and shows that back-of-the-envelope calculations
sing average tax rates may considerably overstate the extent to which
he costs of subsidizing care is oﬀset by increased tax revenues. 
Our results indicate that the net contemporaneous ﬁscal cost of an
dditional child in full time care is substantial: Overall, our estimates
uggest that around 6% of the costs are oﬀset by increased tax rev-
nues. In addition, the cash for care beneﬁts are mechanically reduced
y around 50,000 NOK, increasing the cost oﬀset to around 39%. Of
ourse, there may be other potential costs and beneﬁts from the labor
upply eﬀects that we have estimated, beyond the ﬁscal eﬀects for the
overnment. In particular, our estimates do not capture potential ef-
ects of earlier return to the labor market, either to workers from e.g.
ncreased work experience or to employers from e.g. shorter work dis-
uption or potentially lower worker turnover. 
While much of previous literature on child care and mothers’ la-
or supply points towards mixed and often relatively small impacts of
hild care on parental labor supply, particularly for older kids, our re-
ults indicate that impacts may be relatively strong. This supports some
ecent evidence which suggests that labor supply eﬀects of child care
re larger for younger children, see e.g. Bauernschuster and Schlot-
er (2015) , Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas (2015) and Carta and
izzica (2018) . One explanation may be that the counterfactual mode
f care is diﬀerent: In the absence of formal care, mothers of 2-year-olds
re more likely to stay at home, while mothers of older children may
nd informal care arrangements, possibly using grandparents or other
elatives, that enable them to work even when child care is not avail-
ble. While we do ﬁnd modest (and opposite signed) eﬀects on the labor
articipation of paternal, but not maternal, grandparents, these cannot
xplain the magnitude of the eﬀects on the labor supply of mothers. 
A study that may be particularly relevant for ours is Havnes and
ogstad (2011) . They study a Norwegian expansion of care for
reschoolers in the late 1970s, and ﬁnd estimates that are much smaller
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R  han what we do in this paper. While our study focuses on younger chil-
ren and on a much later time period, it is useful to consider what may
e driving the diﬀerences in the estimated eﬀects. First, note that our es-
imates are scaled to the intensity of child care use. As discussed above,
his seems to be important in this context, where most child care places
re opened in August. Our ﬁrst stage estimates and the scatter plots in
ig. 5 (a) suggest that utilization of both new and existing child care
laces is close to saturation. Second, we have looked at survey data on
he preferred mode of child care collected in 1968 and in 2002 ( Ministry
f Consumer Aﬀairs and Administration, 1972; Moaﬁ and Bjørkli, 2011;
ettersen, 2003; Reppen and Rønning, 1999 ). For preschoolers in 1968,
round 25% of mothers stated a preference for informal solutions such as
hildminders, nannies or relatives. The comparable number for toddlers
n 2002 is around 6%, indicating that preferences of mothers considered
n Havnes and Mogstad (2011) are quite diﬀerent from preferences of
others in the 2000s. This could drive diﬀerences in the demand for in-
ormal care, and in turn explain the large eﬀects today compared to the
970s. Additionally, because maternal employment is much more preva-
ent in the period we consider, the availability of informal sources of care
ould be more limited. This may be particularly true because mothers
n the 1970s typically relied on relatives, neighbors or friends for child
are needs ( Ministry of Consumer Aﬀairs and Administration, 1972 ). 
The results from our analysis are relevant to current political de-
ates, considering that the demand for child care for older children is
ore or less covered in Norway and many western countries. Our ﬁnd-
ngs therefore speak to the eﬃciency of further expansion, and provide
vidence for other countries and governments considering a move to-
ards universally accessible, subsidized child care for young children. 
upplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at 10.1016/j.labeco.2019.101762 . 
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